Using the Doctrine of Equivalents to Provide Broad Protection for Pioneer Patents: Limited Protection for Improvement Patents by Steinhauer, Esther
Pace Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 2 Spring 1992 Article 9
April 1992
Using the Doctrine of Equivalents to Provide Broad
Protection for Pioneer Patents: Limited Protection
for Improvement Patents
Esther Steinhauer
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Esther Steinhauer, Using the Doctrine of Equivalents to Provide Broad Protection for Pioneer Patents:
Limited Protection for Improvement Patents, 12 Pace L. Rev. 491 (1992)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss2/9
Using the Doctrine of Equivalents to
Provide Broad Protection for Pioneer
Patents: Limited Protection for
Improvement Patents
I. Introduction
Courts engage in a two-part analysis when deciding the is-
sue of infringement' during patent disputes. In the first step, the
claims2 are interpreted. Claim interpretation involves a review of
the patent specification,3 the prosecution history,4 and, if neces-
sary, extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony.5 In the second
step, the product accused of infringing is compared to the
claimed invention. 6 Literal infringement is found when "prop-
erly interpreted claims read 7  on the accused product or
1. An infringement of a patent is a violation of the property right in that patent.
Section 271 (a) of the Patent Act states, in pertinent part, "[w]hoever without authority
makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of
the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
2. The claims of the patent provide a concise formal definition of the invention.
They must "particularly [point] out and distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
3. The specification of a patent must describe the manner and process of making
and using the patent so that any person skilled in the patent's art may use it. The speci-
fication "set[s] forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention." Id.
4. The prosecution history of a patent application includes all of the correspon-
dence, including all statements and claim amendments, between the Patent and Trade-
mark Office [PTO] and the inventor or his agent. 37 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1988). This written
history is known as the file history (or file wrapper) of the patent.
5. For an overview of patent infringement analysis, see Autogiro Co. v. United
States, 384 F.2d 391, 397-99 (Ct. Cl. 1967) and McGill, Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d
666, 673-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
6. This was first articulated in Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
See also Senmed, Inc. v. Richard Allan Medical Indus., 888 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988); McGill Inc. v.
John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Coleco Indus. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
7. When the accused device or process is substantially described by the claims set
forth in the invention, it "reads on" the invention. 4 DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.01
(1978 & Supp. 1990).
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
method."8 If literal infringement is found, that is the end of the
inquiry. If literal infringement cannot be established because the
parameters of the claims are not met, the accused invention may
yet be found to infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.9
The equivalents test -applied by the courts was articulated
by the Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prods. Co.10 The Court held that "a patentee may invoke this
doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device 'if it per-
forms substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result'."1
Since Graver Tank, this three-part test has been used by all
courts in deciding equivalence. However, the precise application
of this standard to a particular patent in controversy is in dis-
pute. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in-
terchangeably applies the Graver Tank test using two distinct
analyses - the "element by element" test "2 and the "device as
a whole" test.'3 This Note will show, however, that neither of
these tests has clearly articulated how broadly to extend equiva-
lence in a given infringement analysis.
The doctrine of equivalents was extensively used for a cen-
tury by the Supreme Court to protect pioneer patents against
infringement." Those patents which, in comparison with the
prior art,' 5 were deemed truly pioneering were accorded broad
protection under the doctrine of equivalents. In so doing, the
Court looked to the entire device or machine before deciding in-
8. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1269-70 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
9. Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 400. See also Coleco Indus., 573 F.2d at 1253-54.
10. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). See also infra notes 105-118 and accompanying text.
11. 339 U.S. at 608 (citations omitted) (also known as the "function/way/result"
test).
12. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
13. See, e.g., Texas Instruments v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d 1369 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
14. See infra notes 31-104 and accompanying text.
15. To be patentable, an invention must be distinguishable from the prior art (tech-
nology and teaching already in the public domain). 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
To this end, before granting a patent, the patent examiner conducts a search of issued
patents and relevant technical literature. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (where a patent for the catalytic manufac-
ture of acrylamide was declared invalid in light of two prior art references).
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fringement.1" On the other hand, if the patent was ascertained to
be an improvement patent, the Court would provide only limited
protection. The scope of this protection would be determined by
the specific characteristics embodied in the claims.
1 7
However, by the mid-twentieth century, the "as a whole"
approach was extending broad protection to non-pioneering, but
innovative, patents as well. 8 The doctrine of equivalents had be-
come a mechanism to implement a policy of broad protection for
all patents. 9 This continued to be the state of affairs in infringe-
ment analysis until recently, when the Federal Circuit intro-
duced the "element by element" analysis in its application of
the doctrine. 0 Since then, the Federal Circuit has alternated be-
tween the two tests without rhyme or reason, creating confusion
in infringement analysis.2"
A policy question which continues to confront courts decid-
ing infringement cases is how to best use the doctrine of
equivalents to protect and reward basic research and technology
without stifling future advances.2 2 In claiming a patent, the in-
ventor gives notice to the public as to what is protected, thereby
permitting another to "design around" the patent.23 Thus, a
court confronted with the correct application of the doctrine of
equivalents in an infringement case is also confronted with strik-
ing a balance between these two interests.
This Note reconciles the application of the doctrine of
equivalents with the protection of innovative and useful re-
search, focusing on biotechnology. Section II describes the his-
tory of the doctrine of equivalents and its use by the Supreme
Court to protect pioneer patents. Section III examines the mod-
ern use of this doctrine, including the conflict within the Federal
Circuit on its proper application and its relationship to the doc-
trine of file history estoppel. Section IV addresses the failed at-
tempts by the Federal Circuit to implement a coherent test for
16. See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
17. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 105-140 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 143-168 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 169-239 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
23. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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applying the doctrine and the particular problems faced in adju-
dicating infringement of biotechnology patents without a useful
standard. This section also presents a unified theory for the
modern application of the doctrine of equivalents. The Note
concludes, in section V, that in order to encourage new and in-
novative research, the courts must return to the original raison
d'etre for the doctrine of equivalents by providing broad protec-
tion for pioneer patents.
II. Background
A. The Historical Purpose of Patent Protection
The historical purpose of patent protection has been to en-
courage progress by protecting the inventor in return for disclos-
ing the subject matter of the invention to the public. This pur-
pose was expressed in the United States Constitution24 and
codified in the first two Patent Acts, passed in 1790 and 1793.5
The Acts required that a petition for a patent include a written
specification describing the invention and a declaration that the
inventor believed himself to be the true inventor. 6 In return for
conferring an "exclusive right on an inventor", the statute re-
quired him to "give the public the full benefit of the
discovery." 7
The Patent Act of 1836 established the examination method
for granting patents and created the Patent Office for this pur-
pose.2" Both the 1836 and 1870 Acts required that the inventor
"particularly point out and distinctly claim" his invention or
discovery. 9
The Supreme Court expressed the dual purpose of the pat-
ent laws as promoting scientific advancement and securing ex-
clusive rights to inventors in their own property.3" Whatever the
24. "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (repealed 1793); Patent Act of 1793, ch.
11, 1 Stat. 318-23 (repealed 1836).
26. Id.
27. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 429-33 (1822).
28. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 119-20 (repealed 1870).
29. Id.; Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (repealed 1952).
30. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 341 (1853).
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revisions of a particular patent act, the articulated purpose has
remained the same.
B. Early Supreme Court Cases Applying the Doctrine of
Equivalents
1. Broad Protection for Pioneer Patents; Limited Protec-
tion for Improvement Patents
In the earliest patent infringement cases"' to reach the Su-
preme Court, the doctrine of equivalents was applied broadly to
protect primary or pioneer inventions and was applied narrowly
to limit protection for improvement inventions.32  Analysis of a
case would begin with a review of the prior art to ascertain the
pioneer or improvement status of the plaintiff's patent. The
Court would then proceed to examine where the accused inven-
tion stood in relation to the plaintiffs patent and to determine
whether infringement had occurred.
Evans v. Eaton,33 one of the earliest patent cases to reach
the Supreme Court, used this analytical approach. The question
before the Court was whether the patent for a machine used in
the manufacture of flour had been infringed.3 ' Justice Story re-
viewed the doctrine of equivalents as it had been applied by the
"[Tihe design of the Constitution and the patent laws of the United States, [is] to pro-
mote the progress of the useful arts, and allow inventors to retain to their own use ...
what they themselves
have created." See also Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 121 (1877) ("Rights secured
to an inventor by letters-patent are property which consists in the exclusive privilege of
making and using the invention .... ).
31. Several of these cases include the legal history of the doctrine which dates back
to the English courts. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 399-407 (1822).
32. In the early nineteenth century, a pioneer invention was described as "some-
thing which was entirely unknown before." Id. at 379. An improvement was described as
"an addition to or an alteration in what was previously known." Id.
Sixty-seven years later, in Morley Sewing Machine Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263
(1899), the Court defined a pioneer invention as "one of primary character .... " An
improvement was "a mere change of form or combination of parts . Id. at 274
(citations omitted).
A modern definition of a pioneer invention is one which "first... disclose[s a) basic
operational concept"; an improvement patent is one which issues "in a crowded art."
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
33. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
34. Id. at 357-59.
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circuit court to this patent in an earlier action.35 The circuit
court had invalidated the patent on the ground that it was sub-
stantially the same as an earlier machine not at issue in this
case. 6 The reasoning by the circuit court had been that "if the
two machines be substantially the same, and operate in the same
manner, to produce the same result, though they may differ in
form, proportions, and utility, they are the same in principle...
"37
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding that
the invention in controversy was not original or new. The Court
based its result on a review of the prior art and determined that
the patented machine was an improvement, not an original in-
vention.3 8 Justice Story agreed with the circuit court's decision
to invalidate the patent because "simply changing the form or
the proportion of any machine or composition of matter, in any
degree, shall not be deemed a discovery."3 9 In invalidating the
patented invention, the Court applied the doctrine of
equivalents, albeit not explicitly, and granted broad protection
to an invention which antedated the two in dispute.
The doctrine of equivalents was explicitly used to find in-
fringement in Winans v. Denmead.4 ° The circuit court had held
that the accused invention, an octagonal railroad car used to
transport coal, did not infringe on plaintiff's conical car."1
The Supreme Court first compared the plaintiff's patent to
the prior art, and concluded that "the patentee ha[d] introduced
a mode of operation not before employed . "...42 The Court
then found infringement because "to copy the principle or mode
of operation described, is an infringement, although such copy
should be totally unlike the original in form or proportions. 4 3
Furthermore, "where the whole substance of the invention may
be copied in a different form . . . it is not a defense, that it is
35. Id. at 427-29.
36. Id. at 370.
37. Id. at 361.
38. Id. at 430, 435.
39. Id. at 429.
40. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
41. Id. at 340.
42. Id. at 339.
43. Id. at 342.
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embodied in a form not described . . . ."" Thus, the Court
looked to the whole invention in finding infringement. Justice
Curtis admonished the courts, saying "[i]t is the duty of courts
and juries to look through the form for the substance of the in-
vention . . . ." ,5 This analysis was followed in subsequent cases.
In McCormick v. Talcott," the Supreme Court distin-
guished between the equivalents range permitted to an improve-
ment patent and to a pioneering one. The Court conceded that
an original invention was broadly protected over an accused de-
vice even if the latter was a patentable improvement.47 However,
if the claimed invention was only an improvement on an existing
device, it could not be accorded protection against another im-
provement of the same device which performs the same function
in a different manner."8 The Court was in effect using an "as a
whole" analysis to protect original inventors and a rudimentary
form of the "element by element" analysis for inventors of
improvements.
The Court followed the precedent of granting only limited
protection to an improvement patent in Burr v. Duryee.'9 The
invention in controversy, a machine used in forming hat bod-
ies,5° was "an improvement ... not founded on any new discov-
ery."'" The Court reasoned that an inventor of an improvement
cannot "have a claim to the whole art, discovery, or machine
which he has improved. All others have an equal right to make
improved machines .... ",52 Thus, the Court held that the ac-
cused machine did not infringe.
The breadth of protection accorded an innovative machine
44. Id. at 343.
45. Id.
46. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 402 (1857).
47. Id. at 405. (An improvement invention may be sufficiently different from the
original to merit patentability, yet be found to infringe under a broad application of the
doctrine of equivalents).
48. Id. "The inventor of the first improvement cannot invoke the doctrine of
equivalents to suppress all other improvements which are not mere colorable invasions of
the first." Id.
49. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531 (1864).
50. Id. at 570-74. "Hat-bodies are manufactured out of fibres of fur or wool felted
together." Id. at 533. A "hat-body" is the foundation on which hats are formed. Id. at
537.
51. Id. at 574.
52. Id. at 571.
1992]
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was demonstrated in Blake v. Robertson.3 The Supreme Court
compared a stone crushing machine to its prior art and upheld
the validity of its patent because it was "radical[ly different],
and [went] to the essence of the organisms. ' 54 The Court then
held that the invention of the complainant had embodied all of
the ideas of the patented invention and that it infringed.5 5 Thus,
a machine which used hydraulic pressure to crush rocks, in-
fringed on a machine which used rods and levers because the
Court found it "difficult to resist the conclusion that the change
had no motive or purpose but evasion."56
As the nineteenth century advanced, new machinery was
sometimes innovative without necessarily being the very, first in
its class. In Machine Co. v. Murphy,7 neither party in the case
claimed to be the first and original inventor of a machine for
making paper bags. 8 However, the Supreme Court found that
the patentee was the first to perfect this particular method for
making bags. 9 Because he had created an original invention, the
Court invoked broad protection and held that the knife in the
accused machine was "substantially the same thing as the cutter
in the [complainant's] machine . . 60 Justice Clifford enunci-
ated the standard three-part equivalents test in language almost
identical to that adopted by Justice Story some 50 years earlier
in Evans v. Eaton."' The Court said that machines are to be
examined:
in the light of what they do, or what office or function they per-
form, and how they perform it, and to find that one thing is sub-
stantially the same as another, if it performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
53. 94 U.S. 728 (1876). In this case, the party bringing the action attempted to in-
validate the earlier patent on the ground of lack of novelty. Id. Both of the inventions
were machines which crushed stones. Id. at 730. The earlier invention used rods and
levers to move the crushing jaw; the later device used hydraulic pressure. Id. at 732.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 733.
56. Id. at 732-33.
57. 97 U.S. 120 (1877).
58. Id. at 122.
59. Id. at 123-24.
60. Id. at 126.
61. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822). See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 12:491
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result ... even though they differ in name, form or shape 2
While earlier cases had involved patents for machines, the
patent in Tilghman v. Proctor involved a process for separating
fats into their components." After an extensive review of the
prior art, the Court held that a patent could be granted for a
process," ' reasoning that:
[a] process [may be] susceptible of being applied in many modes
and by the use of many forms of apparatus. The inventor is not
bound to describe them all in order to secure to himself the exclu-
sive right to the process, if he is really its inventor or discoverer. 5
Thus, the Tilghman Court held that a patent could be ob-
tained for any process if the patentee was the first and original
inventor of that process.6 6 Although only one method for apply-
ing the process had been specified in the original patent, the ac-
cused patent infringed in that "the process of [the plaintiff pat-
ent], modified or unmodified by the supposed improvement,
underlies the operation performed" by defendants." An original
process would be protected broadly even if only one mode for
carrying out the process was specified.6 8
In Morley Sewing Machine Co. v. Lancaster, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether a combination inven-
tion could be protected from infringement.6 9 Patents for com-
plex machines which can perform a series of tasks are called
combination patents. 0 In Morley, the patented device was a
sewing machine which was made up of three main groups of in-
strumentalities to automatically sew on buttons."
The Court confirmed the circuit court's finding that the pat-
62. Murphy, 97 U.S. at 125.
63. 102 U.S. 707 (1881).
64. Id. at 722.
65. Id. at 728-29.
66. Id. at 722-28.
67. Id. at 732.
68. Id. at 730.
69. 129 U.S. 263 (1889).
70. Combination machines exist in several forms. One form "embrace[s] both a new
element and new combination of elements, previously used and well known." Another
form is one in which "all the elements of the machine are old, and where the invention
consists in a new combination of those elements . 1 DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS §
1.02[2] (1978 & Supp. 1990) (citations omitted).
71. Morley, 129 U.S. at 265-70.
1992]
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entee was the first to succeed in producing this type of ma-
chine.72 The patentee was therefore entitled to a liberal con-
struction of the claims of the patent because "[h]e was not a
mere improver upon a prior machine .. . in which case, his
claims would properly receive a narrower interpretation. 73 The
Court summarized the well-settled law of the doctrine of
equivalents in the United States and England:
Where an invention is one of a primary character, and the
mechanical functions performed by the machine are, as a whole,
entirely new, all subsequent machines which employ substantially
the same means to accomplish the same result are infringements,
although the subsequent machine may contain improvements in
the separate mechanisms which go to make up the machine. 74
Applying these criteria to the case at hand, the Court re-
versed the circuit court and held that the accused machine, in
which three sets of mechanisms were also combined, infringed. 5
In so doing, the Court granted broad protection to a multifunc-
tional machine, despite the fact that some of the infringing ma-
chine's mechanisms were different. It reasoned that the first in-
vention was of a primary character and that the main operative
features of both machines were the same.7" Subsequent cases
continued to accord a range of equivalents based on the distinc-
tion between a pioneer invention and an improvement
invention.77
2. Use of Patent File History to Limit Improvement
Patents
As demonstrated in the preceding section, the Supreme
Court had been using a specific approach in deciding whether a
72. Id. at 273.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 284.
76. Id.
77. See, for example, Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186 (1894), where the pat-
ented invention was for a spring on a wheel cultivator. Id. at 188. The Court held that
the patented device "cannot be treated as a pioneer in the art. Neither [the inventor],
nor his assignee, [can] be allowed to invoke the doctrine of equivalents, such as the
courts extend to primary inventions, so as to include all forms of spring devices ...." Id.
at 207.
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patent in controversy was infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents. The first step in this approach relied upon classify-
ing the invention as either a pioneer or an improvement in rela-
tion to its prior art.
In Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co.,78 the Su-
preme Court began its analysis with an exhaustive review of the
history of brakes, their improvements and their respective pat-
ents. 79 But before proceeding to an examination of the pioneer
or improvement status of the Westinghouse brake, the Court in-
stead reviewed the file history of its patent.8 0 The Court found
that the original patent application had contained a broad claim
which had been rejected by the PTO on the basis of prior art.81
This claim was subsequently narrowed by the patentee in order
to avoid the prior art. 2
Next, the Court examined whether the Westinghouse patent
was a pioneer patent. The definition used was one which
"cover[s] a function never before performed, a wholly novel de-
vice, or one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct
step in the progress of the art . . ,"' The Court held that the
Westinghouse invention could not be considered a pioneer be-
cause it was never put into successful operation, and to some
extent had been anticipated by an earlier. patent.84
Next, the Court considered infringement. It conceded that
the two devices performed virtually the same functions. 5 How-
ever, just because the "two machines produce the same effect
will not justify the assertion that they are substantially the
same, or that the devices used are, therefore, mere equivalents
for those of the other." '86 The devices were held not mechanical
equivalents because they used significantly different means to
78. 170 U.S. 537 (1898).
79. Id. at 545-53. The patent in suit was for a fluid pressure automatic brake mecha-
nism, to be used primarily in trains. Id.
80. Id. at 558-61.
81. Id. at 558.
82. Id. at 558-60. The Court found that the claim had been limited to a "triple valve
... provided with an auxiliary valve .... Id. at 559. The claim could therefore not be
construed as being a claim for a method or process of braking. Id. at 560.
83. Id. at 561-62.
84. Id. at 562.
85. Id. at 571.
86. Id. at 569 (quoting Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 573 (1864)).
1992]
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accomplish the same function.8 Moreover, the accused device
was a novel and manifest departure from the Westinghouse pat-
ent."8 Thus, the Court held that there was no infringement.89
By placing primary reliance on the file history of the patent
to limit the scope of the patented claims, the Westinghouse
Court introduced a new concept into infringement analysis. The
Court's holding was also supported by the fact that the accused
device used different means to achieve the same result. The dis-
cussion of pioneer status was secondary.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Shiras disagreed with the
Court's use of the file history to limit the scope of the patent
saying that "the courts should be slow to permit their construc-
tion of a patent ... to be affected or controlled by alleged inter-
locutions between the officers in the Patent Office and the
claimant."90
File history was also used to limit the scope of a patent in
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer.9 1 The patentee rested his claim for
infringement on the ground that his combination patent was a
pioneer and, as such, the claims were entitled to a broad and
liberal construction.9 2 However, after examination of the prior
art, the Court held that the patent was not a primary one and
therefore not entitled to receive broad protection.9 3 The Court
then looked at the file history of the patent in order to help con-
87. Id. at 571.
88. Id. at 572.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 582 (Shiras, J., dissenting). Justice Shiras also urged that the Westing-
house patent was indeed a pioneer invention "entitled to a broad or liberal construc-
tion." Id. at 574 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
[T]he law does not require that a discoverer or inventor, in order to get a patent
for a process, must have succeeded in bringing his art to the highest degree of
perfection .... [A] patent for such a discovery is not to be confined to the mere
means [the inventor] improvised to prove the reality of his conception.
Id. at 581 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
91. 192 U.S. 265 (1904). The device in controversy was a sewing machine treadle. Id.
at 265.
92. Id. at 276. The Court reiterated that
[the] word [pioneer] . . . is commonly understood to denote a patent covering a
function never before performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and
importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art, as distinguished
from a mere improvement or perfection of what had gone before.
93. Id. at 276.
[Vol. 12:491
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss2/9
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
strue the scope of the claim. The conclusion was that the claim
was limited to the specification and that there was no
infringement. 4
Before Westinghouse, the Supreme Court's infringement
analysis, using the doctrine of equivalents, began with a deter-
mination of where the invention in controversy fit into the prior
art. If the invention was found to be a pioneer, the Court per-
mitted broad protection by looking at the patented device as a
whole. If instead, the patent was for an improvement, the Court
allowed only a narrow range of equivalents. Starting with West-
inghouse, both the specification and the file history of the pat-
ent were used to limit the scope of the claims.
C. The Modern Doctrine of Equivalents
1. Protection of Non-Pioneer, but Meritorious, Patents
In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,95
the disputed patent was not for the first machine produced to
make self-opening square bags and was not therefore, strictly
speaking, a pioneer invention."6 Nevertheless, the Court decided
that precedent did not support the supposition "that only pio-
neer patents are entitled to invoke the doctrine of
equivalents. '97 It confirmed the lower court's finding that the in-
vention was one "of high rank" and used the patent's file history
to show that the patentee had not in any way limited the scope
of the claims. 8
Thus, for the first time, the Court held that a non-pioneer
patent could be accorded broad protection under the doctrine of
equivalents. To obtain such protection, the Court required that
the invention be innovative in some sense and that the paten-
tee's own words, as recorded in the file history, not limit the
claims. 99
94. Id. at 278.
95. 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
96. Id. at 414.
97. Id. at 415.
98. Id. at 414, 419-20.
99. Id. at 419. The Court had skirted this same question a few years earlier in Ma-
chine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120 (1878). At that time, the Court had not directly ad-
dressed the issue of what range of equivalents to afford improvement patents. The Court
merely found that the patentee had been the first to make that particular type of device
19921
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The concept that all patents of merit should be accorded a
broad range of protection under the doctrine of equivalents was
taken a step further in Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters.00
The device in controversy was a swinging lever latch for refriger-
ators. 10 1 In its analysis of the invention, the Court said that
"while this patent came into a prior art crowded with various
latch devices . . . and was not a pioneer patent entitled to a
broad range of equivalents, the structure . . . was meritorious
and soon attained a large measure of commercial success. "102
The Court held that the accused device infringed since it was
"substantially identical, operating upon the same principle, and
accomplishing the same result in substantially the same way."10
In giving broad equivalents protection to a non-pioneering,
but important and successful patent, the Court was following
the lead of Continental Paper Bag.04 Although neither patent
in these two cases was for a pioneer invention, each had been
accorded broad protection because the Court nevertheless found
criteria of innovation, merit and success.
2. Protection of Pioneer and Improvement Inventions
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.0 5 stands for
the proposition that any invention can be accorded broad pro-
tection from infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and
has become a touchstone ot modern patent infringement law.'
The patent in controversy was for an electric welding composi-
tion (flux) containing two alkaline earth metal silicates - cal-
and held that the accused device infringed because it was almost identical to the former
in structure and function. Id. at 125. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
In Continental Paper Bag, the Court had also devoted a portion of the opinion to
reviewing the policy of American patent laws and affirmed that inventors must be pro-
tected. "The inventor is one who has discovered something of value. It is his absolute
property." Continental Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 424.
100. 280 U.S. 30 (1929).
101. Id. at 36.
102. Id. at 39-40.
103. Id. at 41.
104. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
105. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
106. For further discussion of the role of this opinion in the caselaw, see Judge New-
man's commentary in Pennwalt v, Durand-Wayland, Inc. 833 F.2d 931, 954 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (en banc).
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cium and magnesium. 10 7 The accused flux substituted silicates of
calcium and manganese, the latter being a non-alkaline earth
metal. 08
The Court, in considering the doctrine of equivalents,
stated: "to permit imitation of a patented invention which does
not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection
of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing." 10 9 Justice
Jackson, citing the language of Sanitary Refrigerator, held that
"a patentee may invoke this doctrine . . . 'if it performs substan-
tially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain
the same result'."11 ' Thus, a court must consider a patent ingre-
dient in light of its purpose, its function, and its qualities in
combination with other ingredients."'
The criterion to be used is the invention as a whole because
otherwise "the unscrupulous copyist [would] make unimportant
and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which,
though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied mat-
ter outside the claim ....", This was an articulation of a broad
doctrine of equivalents applied to an invention as a whole. Fur-
thermore, the Court extended the doctrine to operate in favor of
a patentee of a secondary invention which combines old ingredi-
ents to produce new and useful results.'1 3
After elaborating on the doctrine of equivalents, the Court
applied it to the case. It also eschewed its own analysis of the
prior art and the pioneering status, or lack thereof, of the Linde
patent.1 4 The question had been discussed at trial, and that sta-
tus was explained in the Court's earlier decision on the validity
of the Linde patent. 5 In its earlier decision, the Supreme Court
107. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 607.
110. Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42
(1929)); see supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. This has become known as the
three-part Graver Tank test.
111. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
112. Id. at 607.
113. Id. at 608.
114. Id. at 610.
115. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 336 U.S. 271 (1949). This decision
only addressed the validity of the Linde patent. The subsequent Graver Tank decision
in 1950, see supra note 105, is the classical discussion of the doctrine of equivalents and
is the Graver Tank referred to throughout this Note.
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affirmed the trial court's decision that the patentee's invention
had produced results that were remarkably different from those
of prior methods." 6
Thus, the Linde invention was innovative, of high merit and
can be classed with the inventions described in Sanitary Refrig-
erator and Continental Paper Bag."7 It therefore appears that
in Graver Tank, the Court was not according broad protection
to all patents. Rather, the Court reiterated the view that those
non-pioneering inventions which are innovative and really create
new art should be protected." 8
III. The Doctrine of Equivalents After Graver Tank
A. Expansive Doctrine of Equivalents
After Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.,"9 it de-
volved to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and
the Court of Claims to interpret the doctrine of equivalents in
infringement cases because the Supreme Court declined to cer-
tify most patent cases.'20 In Autogiro Co. of America v. United
States,'2' decided by the Court of Claims, the patents in suit
were for rotor structures andcontrol systems on rotary wing air-
craft (helicopters).' 2
The court began its analysis with a comprehensive review of
patent infringement law. 2 3 The court stated that literal overlap
was only a step and not the entire test of infringement. Infringe-
ment could still be found by applying the doctrine of
equivalents. 24 The range of equivalents is dependent upon the
status of the invention. The court stated that "pioneer patents
are to be given wider ranges of equivalence than minor improve-
116. Id. at 274.
117. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263 (1889); see also
supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
119. 339 U.S. 605 (1950); see supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
120. Patent cases were formerly appealed to the CCPA and Court of Claims, as well
as circuit courts. The decisions of the predecessor courts are binding on the Court of
Appeals, for the Federal Circuit. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
121. 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
122. Id. at 401.
123. Id. at 397-401.
124. Id. at 400.
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ment patents.' '1 25
At this point, the file history of a patent assumed impor-
tance in determining infringement. The court said:
The doctrine of equivalents is subservient to file wrapper estop-
pel." It may not include anything within its range that would
vitiate limitations expressed before the Patent Office .... Thus a
patent that has been severely limited to avoid the prior art will
only have a small range between it and the point beyond which it
violates file wrapper estoppel. A patent which is a major depar-
ture from the prior art will have a larger range in which equiva-
lence can function. 12 7
The court relied heavily on the file histories of the patents in
deciding infringement in this case, which involved sixteen pat-
ents and a variety of claims. The test for infringement was: de-
termine which of the accused structures do the same work, in
substantially the same way to accomplish substantially the same
result. In other words, the court applied the Graver Tank test.'2 8
In Coleco Indus. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,'29
the Graver Tank test'30 was also used to find infringement. The
patents in question related to swimming pool frame assem-
blies.1 31 The court held that screws functioning as part of a lock-
ing structure in the accused invention were equivalent to tabs
with similar function in the patented structure.1 3 2
The court agreed that the doctrine of equivalents "arms a
patentee against a person who merely substitutes a functionally
equivalent element in a device and thereby practices the inven-
125. Id.
126. File wrapper estoppel "is the application of familiar estoppel principles to Pat-
ent Office prosecution .... [An] applicant will insert limitations and restrictions for the
purpose of inducing the Patent Office to grant his patent. When the patent is issued, the
patentee cannot disclaim these alterations and seek an interpretation that would ignore
them." Id. at 398-99.
The court pointed out that file wrapper estoppel serves two functions. It "define[s]
terms, but also set[s] the barriers within which the claim's meaning must be kept ....
The prior art cited in the file wrapper gives clues as to what the claims do not cover." Id.
at 399.
127. Id. at 400-01 (footnote omitted).
128. Id. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
129. 573 F.2d 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
130. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
131. Coleco Indus., 573 F.2d at 1250.
132. Id. at 1255.
1992]
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
tion without bringing his device within a literal reading of the
patent claims." '133 However, there was no infringement in this
case because the patentee was limited by file wrapper estop-
pel."" "A patentee having argued a narrow construction for his
claims before the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), should be precluded from arguing a broader construction
for the purposes of infringement. '"135
Autogiro'36 and Coleco Indus.' demonstrate the profound
change which had occurred in the doctrine of equivalents analy-
sis. First, an accused invention was subjected to the three-part
Graver Tank test to determine whether it performed the same
function in substantially the same way to produce substantially
the same result as the patented invention.138 Thereafter, the file
history of the patent was examined. Often, even if an accused
invention fulfilled all of the infringement criteria, a court would
not find infringement because of file wrapper estoppel. Thus, the
arguments and amendments made during patent prosecution
before the PTO assumed the greatest importance.3 9 The pioneer
status of the original patent was, in effect, no longer part of in-
fringement analysis. 40
B. Early Decisions in the Federal Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was
created by Congress in 1982 by merging the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) with the Court of Claims."" In-
fringement suits had previously been decided independently by
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1257. See also supra note 126 for a definition of file wrapper estoppel.
135. Coleco Indus., 573 F.2d at 1257.
136. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
139. This reasoning had earlier been applied by the Supreme Court only to amend-
ments made before the PTO in Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126,
136 (1942) ("[bly the amendment, [patentee] recognized and emphasized the difference
between the two phrases and proclaimed his abandonment of all that is embraced in that
difference.").
140. For an example, see the infringement analyses in Coleco Indus., 573 F.2d at
1254-55; see also Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 399-401.
141. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982).
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the district courts in each circuit and the aim was to develop a
consistent body of patent law.14 2
In its first cases 4" the Federal Circuit applied the same
reading of the doctrine of equivalents as had been used in the
Court of Claims and the CCPA."' Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Berco,"'5 concerned the patent for the seal of a lubricated track
for crawler type tractors.'4' The Federal Circuit engaged in a
traditional analysis of the invention in relation to its prior art
and also examined its file history.'4 7 The court then applied the
Graver Tank three-part test and held that there was infringe-
ment. 48  The dissent disagreed with the court's use of
equivalents and argued that the file history precluded the find-
ing of infringement." 9 Thus, arguments over the role of a pat-
ent's file history continued to dominate the application of the
doctrine of equivalents in determining infringement.
In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,5 ' the Federal Cir-
cuit attempted to clarify the relationship between the doctrine
of equivalents and the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel. First,
Chief Judge Markey quoted Graver Tank extensively.' 5' He
then categorically rejected the view, held by some courts, that
virtually any amendment to a claim during its prosecution cre-
ates'a file wrapper estoppel that limits the patentee to the literal
words of the claim and deprives the patentee of protection
under the doctrine of equivalents. 52 Instead, Chief Judge Mar-
key stated that "[d]epending on the nature and purpose of the
amendment, it may have a limiting effect within a spectrum
ranging from great to small to zero."' 3
The patent under consideration was for "store and execute"
142. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1989).
143. In its first case, the CAFC adopted as precedent the previous holdings of its
predecessor courts. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
144. See supra notes 119-40 and accompanying text.
145. 714 F.2d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
146. Id. at 1112.
147. Id. at 1114-16.
148. Id. at 1115-16.
149. Id. at 1117 (Davis, J., dissenting).
150. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
151. Id. at 1361.
152. Id. at 1362-63.
153. Id.
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spacecraft and described a method for velocity and attitude con-
trol. " The court agreed that the patented invention.was enti-
tled to equivalents protection although it was not a pioneer pat-
ent and not entitled to the "very broad range of equivalents to
which pioneer inventions are normally entitled."'155 The court
held that it was necessary to "apply the doctrine of equivalents
to the claimed invention as a whole."'16 It was not enough to
simply look for "obvious and exact" equivalents, the presence of
which would effectively produce literal infringement.' The
court stressed that "substitution of an embellishment made pos-
sible by post- [invention] technology does not avoid infringe-
ment."" The dissent argued that the prosecution history of the
plaintiff's patent precluded a finding that the accused device
performed the same function in the same way.1
59
In this decision, the Federal Circuit did two things. First, it
hearkened back to the requirement for comparing inventions in
their entirety before assessing infringement. As the Supreme
Court said in Graver Tank, s0 "[e]quivalence, in the patent law,
is not the prisoner of a formula .... It does not require com-
plete identity for every purpose and in every respect."'' Second,
the Hughes court categorically rejected "a wooden application of
[file history] estoppel," which would vitiate the doctrine of
equivalents and contfine infringement analysis to a considera-
tion of literal infringement. 62 Although the Hughes decision did
not finally lay to rest the arguments over the relationship be-
tween equivalents and file history estoppel, subsequent decisions
generally adhered to the Hughes analysis. 6 3
154. Id. at 1353.
155. Id. at 1362.
156. Id. at 1364 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 1364.
158. Id. at 1364-65.
159. Id. at 1367 (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). See supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
161. Id. at 609.
162. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying
text.
163. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984) (a patent for the optical structure of a projection printer
used in the manufacture of integrated circuits was infringed by a projection printer
which differed in its adjustment of the curvature and placement of one mirror); Thomas
& Betts Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 720 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (a single strut
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Despite extensive precedent,""' the Federal Circuit used a
different approach to find no infringement in Lemelson v.
United States.'65 The method claim in issue was "directed to
measuring the distance between two surfaces of a workpiece.'
66
Judge Baldwin held that "in order for a court to find infringe-
ment, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or
its substantial equivalent in the accused device" - 'the "ele-
ment by element" test.1 67 Thus, there was no infringement be-
cause several components of the accused machine did not corre-
spond to the means used in plaintiff's claims.'68
However, in Martin v. Barber,'"9 Judge Baldwin returned to
the position that inventions must be examined in their entirety
during infringement analysis, reiterating the "as a whole" test.17 1
He vacated the district court's decision on the ground that
although framed in equivalence language, the court's analysis is
no more than a substituted test for literal infringement ....
[W]here an accused device avoids literal infringement by chang-
ing an element of a claimed invention, it is appropriate to con-
sider .. .whether the changed element operates in substantially
the same way as the claimed element.'
Similarly, in Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd.,' 7 the patents
electrical connector infringed upon a double strut patent). See also, Carman Indus. v.
Wahl, 724 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (a device which promoted the flow of solids from a
bin was infringed by a device which performed this function but not the secondary func-
tion of stopping the flow after the vibration ended).
164. See, e.g., Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l Research B.V., 738 F.2d
1237, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("the doctrine of file history estoppel [does not always] com-
pletely prohibit[] a patentee from recapturing some of what was originally claimed");
Atlas Powder Co. v. E:I. du Pont De Nemours, 750 F.2d 1569, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(where the court held infringement although "the accused product avoids literal infringe-
ment by changing one ingredient of a claimed composition . . . [because] the changed
ingredient has the same purpose, quality and function as the claimed ingredient").
165. 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
166. Id. at 1541.
167. Id. at 1551.
168. Id. The prosecution (or file) history of the patent in controversy was deemed
not significant to the issue. Id. at 1550.
169. 755 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The claimed patent was for gravity inversion
boots and the accused invention was for an ankle supporting device on a tilt table used
for the same purpose. Id. at 1566.
170. Id. at 1568. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
171. Id. at 1568.
172. 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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in issue were directed to anaerobic curing compositions. 17 The
Federal Circuit said that the finding of a difference between the
claimed and accused inventions is not sufficient to establish that
the two devices do not perform in substantially the same way.1 74
"That finding ... would allow the difference itself to dictate a
finding of no equivalence, and. . . one could never have infringe-
ment by equivalence. '1 75
The court also pointed to the limited effect of file wrapper
estoppel on equivalents analysis, asserting that the reason for a
surrender is as important as the nature of what was surren-
dered. 176 In some cases a patentee can recapture some of what
was originally claimed. 177 Thus, in this case, because the accused
product "may be using the most important aspect if not the gist
of Loctite's inventions, . . . the prosecution history will not nec-
essarily prevent the . . . court from applying the doctrine of
equivalents ....
These cases dramatically demonstrate the struggle within
the Federal Circuit in applying the doctrine of equivalents. The
concept of a pioneering patent had disappeared, although some
opinions still paid lip service to the idea. Instead, the court had
become mired in the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel. The court
struggled with the questions of what was actually included in it,
when to use it, and how far it could go to prevent the applica-
tion of the doctrine of equivalents.
The court was also divided in its use of the Graver Tank
three-part test 179 in determining what range of equivalents to ac-
cord a given patent. While some courts looked at the whole in-
vention, 8 others applied the test to each separate element 81 of
the claims in controversy.
173. Id. at 866.
174. Id. at 870.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 871 (citing Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 738 F.2d at 1243). But see Builders
Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Prod. Co., 757 F.2d 255, 260 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the
prosecution history of claims not in suit may be relevant to limit the scope of the claims
actually in suit).
177. Loctite, 781 F.2d at 871.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 143-63 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
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C. Recent Decisions of the Federal Circuit
The controversy in the Federal Circuit settled down to a
struggle over whether to use the "as a whole" or the "element by
element" approach. In Texas Instruments v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n,182 Judge Newman categorically stated that the claimed
invention must be viewed as a whole.' At issue was whether a
patent for portable electronic calculators was infringed."", The
court found that the claimed patent represented a pioneering in-
vention.18 5 The court also agreed that "every function described
in the patent is performed by the accused calculators. '"18 How-
ever, "[i]t is not appropriate in this case, where all of the
claimed functions are performed in the accused devices by sub-
sequently developed or improved means, to view each such
change as though it were the only change from the enclosed em-
bodiments of the invention. 18 7 Thus, even though there was
nothing in the file history of the patent to constrain the breadth
of the claims,188 the court held no infringement.18 9 However,
Judge Newman allowed that any individual difference by itself
might have resulted in a finding of infringement under the "as a
whole" theory.1 90
In Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,'91 the
Federal Circuit returned to the position that every element of a
claim is important. 9 ' The device in controversy was a resonator
coupler for an electrodeless discharge lamp.' The court started
the analysis'by affirming that the claimed patent was for an im-
provement and not for a pioneer invention.1 9
182. 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
183. Id. at 1569.
184. Id. at 1560.
185. Id. at 1568.
186. Id. at 1567.
187. Id. at 1570.
188. Id. at 1571.
189. Id. at 1570.
190. Id. at 1570-72.
191. 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
192. Id. at 1533.
193. Id. at 1529. The patentee had employed a tap coupling device whereas the ac-
cused product employed a loop coupling. Id. at 1531.
194. Id. at 1532; see supra note 32 and accompanying text for the distinction be-
tween pioneer and improvement inventions.
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The court stated that a non-pioneer was entitled to some
range of equivalents. 195 However, "each element of a claim is
material and essential, and in order for a court to find infringe-
ment, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or
its substantial equivalent in the accused device."196 Finally, the
court affirmed the district court decision, finding no infringe-
ment, on the ground that the accused device did not operate in
substantially the same way as the claimed invention.19 7
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Newman argued that
the majority had "magnified scientific differences beyond their
reasonable meaning"' 98 and that the two transformers were in-
terchangeable.1 99 She charged that in so doing "the majority has
departed even farther from our consistent requirement that the
invention as a whole be considered. '20 0
Actually, Judge Newman was correct because in this deci-
sion Judge Markey had made a 180 degree turn from his policy
and decision in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States.20 1 There
he had said that courts ought to look at the invention as a whole
because simply looking for obvious and exact equivalents would
be tantamount to a literal infringement analysis.20 2
Faced with this split in interpretation of the doctrine of
equivalents, the Federal Circuit attempted to bring order to the
analysis of the law in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland,
Inc. 203 The patent in controversy was for a fruit sorter which
sorted by color, weight or a combination of the two. 04
The district court had found that certain functions of the
claimed inventions were missing from the accused devices and
that those functions which were performed were substantially
different.2 05 It had used an "element by element" comparison to
reach the conclusion that there was no infringement under the
195. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F.2d at 1532.
196. Id. at 1533 (quoting Lemelson, 752 F.2d at 1551).
197. Id. at 1535.
198. Id. at 1536 (Newman, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1541 (Newman, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1542 (Newman, J., dissenting).
201. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
202. See supra notes 150-62 and accompanying text.
203. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
204. Id. at 933.
205. Id. at 935.
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doctrine of equivalents.0 6
A majority of the court, sitting en banc, affirmed the district
court decision, using Lemelson v. United States20 1 to support
the position that each element of the "claim [was] material and
essential. 20 8
The court also reviewed the prosecution history of the
claimed patent. It found that a position indicator had been
added to the original claim to allow patentability of the device
over the prior art.20 9 Because the accused devices had no such
component with which to determine the position of the items to
be sorted, the court held that they did not function in substan-
tially the same way.210
Four judges dissented on the ground that "the majority
ha[d] contrived an analytical framework for the doctrine of
equivalents that is little more than a redundant literal infringe-
ment, which renders the doctrine . . . so unduly restrictive and
inflexible as to end its usefulness .. ".. ,,21 The dissent asserted
that the Graver Tank test should be applied to the allegedly in-
fringing devices on an "as a whole" basis. 12
The majority decision was so controversial that Judges Nies
and Newman each added a separate addendum containing their
views. 2" Thus, Pennwalt resolved nothing.
IV. Doctrine of Equivalents After Pennwalt
A. Internecine Strife Within the Federal Circuit
The Pennwalt decision has not solved the problem of how
to apply the doctrine of equivalents. 2 " As shown below, Federal
Circuit decisions continue to rely on either the "as a whole" or
the "element by element" approach, depending on which judge
is sitting on the panel.
206. Id.
207. 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
208. 833 F.2d at 935.
209. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 939-40 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 948 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 949 (Nies, J., additional views); Id. at 954 (Newman, J., commentary).
214. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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For example, in Spectra Corp. v. Lutz,215 the court, in an
opinion by Chief Judge Markey, used the "element by element"
approach." 6 The holding was that the dyeing function per-
formed by. an accused product could not be substantially the
same as that performed by the patented dye toner because the
former was missing a polymer present in the claimed dye.2" In
using the "element by element" approach, the Federal Circuit
made a complete reversal from its position in Loctite Corp. v.
Ultraseal Ltd. There, Judge Baldwin stated categorically that a
difference between two patents was not in itself sufficient to ob-
viate infringement by the doctrine of equivalents.1 8
Judge Newman reiterated that equivalence is evaluated in
the context of the invention as a whole in the Federal Circuit's
second Texas Instruments decision, denying a petition for re-
hearing. 19 She was attempting to clarify her earlier Texas In-
struments decision,22 ° where the court had found no infringe-
ment. That earlier holding was based on the finding that
although the accused calculators performed all the functions of
the claimed calculators, the means employed were different.221
Therefore, evaluating the claimed invention as a whole, there
was no equivalence.222 In Graver Tank22 3 language, the court was
saying that, as a whole, the two instruments performed the same
function with the same result, but in a different way.
It is interesting to compare this case with Morley Sewing
Machine Co. v. Lancaster,22 where the patent was also for an
invention composed of several different elements. 2 5 The Su-
preme Court had held that because that invention was of a pri-
mary character, it was entitled to liberal construction of the
215. 839 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
216. Id. at 1582.
217. Id.
218. 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see supra notes 172-78 and accompanying
text.
219. Texas Instruments v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
220. 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see supra notes 182-90 and accompanying text.
221. Texas Instruments, 846 F.2d at 1370-71.
222. Id.
223. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
224. 129 U.S. 263 (1889).
225. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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claims.2 6 The Court said:
Where .. .the mechanical functions performed by the machine
are, as a whole, entirely new, all subsequent machines which em-
ploy substantially the same means to accomplish the same result
are infringements, although the subsequent machine may con-
tain improvements in the separate mechanisms which go to
make up the machine.227
One might therefore have expected the "as a whole" ap-
proach to yield a finding of infringement in the Texas Instru-
ments case as well. A close examination of Judge Newman's
opinion leads to the conclusion that the decision actually fits
better with the "element by element" approach, something
which was not lost on Judge Nies in her dissent from denial of
hearing en banc.225 Judge Nies also reiterated that the Pennwalt
decision should have ended the debate over which standard to
use in equivalents analysis, in favor of the "element by element"
test.22 9
Judge Nies used the "element by element" test in Corning
Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc.23° The patents in
controversy related to the structure, composition, and produc-
tion of fused silica optical waveguide fibers. 23' The district court
had found that the accused fibers, which contained a materiai to
lower the refractive index of the outside layer relative to the
core, infringed on the patented fibers which contained a material
to increase the index of refraction of the core relative to the
outside layers.232
Judge Nies restated the Pennwalt rule that "infringement
requires that each element of a claim or its substantial
equivalent be found in the accused device. 2 33 Thus, one might
have expected, based on precedent, that this approach would
226. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
227. Morley, 129 U.S. 263, 273 (1889) (emphasis added).
228. Texas Instruments, 846 F.2d at 1372 (Nies, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 1372-73 (Nies, J., dissenting).
230. 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
231. Id. at 1254-55. "Optical waveguides are a unique type of optical fiber ... that
limit the transmitted light to preselected modes. ... Id. at 1256.
232. Id. at 1259.
233. Id.
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yield a finding of no infringement.2 3 However, the court af-
firmed the finding of infringement, stating that "[a]n equivalent
must be found for every limitation of the claim somewhere in an
accused device, but not necessarily in a corresponding compo-
nent ... " 35
This result could not have been predicted from earlier Fed-
eral Circuit decisions applying the "as a whole" test, such as
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States.236 This result could not
have been predicted from earlier Federal Circuit decisions which
had applied the "element by element" test. For instance, Spec-
tra v. Lutz was an analogous case where the court used the "ele-
ment by element" approach. 37 No infringement was found be-
cause the accused compound, which produced the same result,
lacked a specific ingredient. 3  These cases graphically illus-
trate2 39 that by not taking a coherent approach to the doctrine
of equivalents analysis, the Federal Circuit has created
confusion.
A recent case which addresses the use of the doctrine of
equivalents in an infringement action is Wilson Sporting Goods
v. David Geoffrey & Assocs.2 " The patent in controversy was for
the configuration of dimples on a golf ball cover.24' The analysis
began with review of the prior art and file history242 of the plain-
tiff's patent.
234. See supra notes 165-68, 191-97 & 203-10 and accompanying text.
235. Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1259. The court quoted Atlas Powder Co. v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984). "Where, as here, the
accused product avoids literal infringement by changing one ingredient of a claimed
composition, it is appropriate for a court to consider in assessing equivalence whether
the changed ingredient has the same purpose, quality, and function as the claimed ingre-
dient." Id. at 1579-80. Using this language, over 130 years earlier, the Supreme Court
found infringement under the "as a whole" rationale. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 330 (1853). See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
236. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see supra notes 150-62 and accompanying text.
237. 839 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
238. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
239. See also, Senmed, Inc. v. Richard Allan Medical Indus., 888 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (where the patent for a skin stapler was estopped by its prosecution history from
being accorded any equivalents); Insta-Foam Prod. v. Universal Foam Sys., 906 F.2d 698
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (where a foam mixing and dispensing gun with a replacement nozzle
infringed on a patented gun whose nozzle was not replaceable).
240. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
241. Id. at 679.
242. Id. at 678-81.
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The court then turned to a discussion of how the prior art
acted as a limitation on the range of permissible equivalents by
limiting the scope of what the inventor could claim.2"" To con-
ceptualize this idea, Judge Rich constructed a hypothetical
claim encompassing the accused product and asked whether this
claim would have been permitted by the PTO during the origi-
nal application.2" ' The court then held that this hypothetical
claim would not have been allowed by the PTO "because it
reached the prior art, and that therefore the patentee could not
be allowed a range of equivalents broad enough to encompass
the accused golf balls. '24 5
This opinion used a new approach, construction of a hypo-
thetical claim, to determine the range of equivalents which may
be permitted for an invention. However, the court cited no pre-
cedent for such an approach, and discussed no relationship be-
tween this approach and those used by previous courts. The
opinion appears to be based on a whole view of the invention;
however, this was only indirectly mentioned.2 46 Considering the
extremes to which several Federal Circuit judges have gone to
clarify their personal positions on whether to use the "as a
whole" or "element by element" test,247 the reasonable assump-
tion would be that this is an important issue to address in
equivalents analysis.
By restricting the range of equivalents to what would have
been permitted by the PTO over the prior art,248 Judge Rich was
merely restating, in an alternate form, the doctrine of file history
estoppel. This doctrine was enunciated almost identically in Au-
togiro Co. of America v. United States2 49 and has been exten-
sively used by the Federal Circuit since the Autogiro decision.25 °
243. Id. at 684.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 685.
246. See id.; see supra notes 150-62 and accompanying text for discussion of the "as
a whole" test.
247. See supra notes 203-13 and accompanying text.
248. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 685.
249. 384 F.2d 391, 400-01 (Ct. Cl. 1967). See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying
text.
250. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
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The "hypothetical claim" analysis used in this case, 25'
determines the range of equivalents permitted a patent based on
what claims would have been "allowed by the PTO over the
prior art. 251 2 However, this analysis works only where the inven-
tion in controversy differs incrementally from the prior art.
Where the claimant has carved out a narrow window for his in-
vention, there is a strong probability that the prior art will re-
strict the allowable equivalents. However, in the situation where
the claim is for a new or innovative invention, there is little limi-
tation on the equivalents by the prior art. Extending the Wilson
court rationale, any pioneer patent would be entitled to unlim-
ited equivalents. As amply demonstrated above,5 3 this was
clearly not the intention of the Federal Circuit. Thus, Judge
Rich's approach does little to advance coherency in doctrine of
equivalents analysis.
B. A Unified Standard for Application of the Doctrine of
Equivalents
The Federal Circuit was founded, in large part, to create a
unified and coherent system of patent law.254 As demonstrated
in the above sections of this article, a coherent doctrine of
equivalents has eluded the court. The doctrine was originally
used to grant broad protection from infringement to pioneering
and innovative inventions.5 5 In the 150 years that have elapsed,
the doctrine has been overshadowed by the doctrine of file his-
tory estoppel.2 56 The Federal Circuit has consistently stated that
"[tihe doctrine of equivalence is subservient to file wrapper es-
toppel. ' ' 257 Thus, a court generally begins its equivalents analysis
with a determination of whether the patentee has narrowed his
251. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 150-239 and accompanying text.
254. See generally Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 979 (1987); see also
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1-8 (1989); see also supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 31-77 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 4, 126-27 & 150-62 and accompanying text for discussions of
file history estoppel.
257. Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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claims before the PTO. If so, the claimant is estopped from in-
voking broad equivalents protection.258 If the court finds no es-
toppel, the Graver Tank test.59 is applied.
A problem arises at this point because the Federal Circuit is
divided on whether to apply the Graver Tank standard to the
invention as a whole, or to each element. '60 Furthermore, the ap-
plication of one test or the other in a particular infringement
suit has continually yielded inconsistent results. 6 '
The doctrine of equivalents has a valuable role to play in
evaluating whether infringement has occurred. This Note pro-
poses a two-part analysis to resolve the problem created by the
split within the Federal Circuit concerning this important doc-
trine. It is still true that inventions generally fall into two clas-
ses - pioneers and improvements." 2 In the first step, a court
would be required to perform a survey of the prior art 26e in order
to determine whether the patented invention is a pioneer or was
issued in a crowded art.
The next step would proceed by a bifurcated analysis. If the
invention is deemed to be a pioneer, the court would apply the
Graver Tank test to the invention "as a whole". If, on the other
hand, the invention is for an improvement, the Graver Tank test
would be applied on an "element by element" basis. At this
point in the analysis, the court would examine the prosecution
history of the application.2 64 Thus, file wrapper estoppel would
be subservient to the doctrine of equivalents.
This analysis 6 5 would permit the holders of patents for in-
258. See supra notes 240-50 and accompanying text.
259. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). The Graver
Tank test is: the accused invention must perform "substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result." Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608. See
also supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 182-239 and accompanying text.
261. Id. See William E. Player, ELEMENTAL EQUIVALENCE: Interpreting
"Substantially the Same Way" under Pennwalt after Corning Glass, 72 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 47 (1989).
262. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
265. A rudimentary form of this type of analysis was employed by the Supreme
Court in McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 402 (1858). Of course, at that time,
the doctrine of file history estoppel did not exist. See also supra notes 46-48 and accom-
panying text.
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novative and pioneering inventions to defend themselves from
encroachment by those who would otherwise, under the guise of
minor changes in the product or method, be permitted to take
advantage of their effort and original work. The application of
this analytical framework is presented below in the context of
biotechnology patents.
C. What Standard for Biotechnology Patents?
As shown in the preceding discussion, the historical protec-
tion afforded pioneer and innovative inventions through broad
application of the doctrine of equivalents, although sometimes
mentioned in Federal Circuit decisions, is no longer of primary
importance. 266 As the court stated in Texas Instruments v. Int'l
Trade Comm'n,267 "pioneer status does not change the way in-
fringement is determined .... ,,2" Because the Federal Circuit
has not provided clear guidelines on how to determine the per-
mitted range of equivalents for a disputed invention, patents in-
volving the use of highly specialized and sophisticated tech-
niques" 9 are likely to be the most adversely affected. A
particularly discouraging example is to be found in biotechnol-
ogy. 270 Biomedical research is now coming to fruition in a large
number of biotech-based patents, accompanied by related in-
fringement cases.27 1 How can scientists and pharmaceutical/bio-
technology corporations expect the courts to decide equivalents
ranges in infringement questions? Can a unified theory of
equivalents mitigate the perceived problems?
Genentech, Inc. v. The Wellcome Found. Ltd., 2 concerned
a recombinant protein, tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA).273
266. See supra notes 150-81 and accompanying text.
267. 846 F.2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
268. Id. at 1370.
269. See, e.g., James Ellingboe, Special Focus - Polymerase Chain Reaction, 10 BI-
oTECHNIQUES 16 (1990); see also Ann Gibbons, Molecular Scissors: RNA Enzymes Go
Commercial, 251 SCIENCE 521 (1991).
270. For brevity, this article discusses only biotechnology patents. However, these
same issues are entirely applicable to chemical and engineering patents as well.
271. Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., Entering Our Third Century, 9 PTC NEWSLETTER, Fall
1990, at 3-4; see also Biotech Drugs in the Pipeline, CHEMICALWEEK, May 16, 1990, at 45.
272. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (D.C. Del. 1990).
273. Tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA) is a protein enzyme which is found in the
human body. Its function is to activate, by cutting or cleavage, a protein named plasmi-
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The district court examined whether the recombinant protein
was infringed by two modified proteins with the same activating
function, also produced using recombinant technology. Each ac-
cused protein differed slightly from the plaintiff's protein. One
contained a single amino acid substitution in the active portion
of the t-PA molecule and the second was a deletion derivative of
t-PA.274 The court determined that all three of the proteins
stimulate dissolution of fibrin clots through enzymatic cleavage
of plasminogen to plasmin. 7 5 Thus they have the same intended
function and result. 76 However, because there were some dis-
tinctions in the binding, half-life and rate of clearance between
the accused proteins and the patented t-PA, the court held that
the former may be achieving their result by some means differ-
ent from the original protein.2" Thus, the court remanded the
case for further findings.27 8
Although each of the proteins in this dispute was produced
by recombinant technology, the opinion contained no discussion
of the state of prior art at the time that plaintiff's patent issued
to determine whether or not the plaintiff was a pioneer in this
field. This is an important consideration for several reasons.
First, the plaintiff's invention might have provided break-
through technology and information not heretofore available.
This could have provided the defendants with enough informa-
tion to deliberately design t-PA substitutes which would avoid
literal infringement yet. be competitive in the marketplace be-
cause they have the same clinical application.279 As the Supreme
Court said in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.
Co., 28 0 "[o]ne who seeks to pirate an invention . . .may be ex-
nogen. The activated form, plasmin, is involved in dissolving clots in blood vessels. In
this capacity, t-PA is used clinically to minimize lasting damage from heart attacks
caused by clots in the blood vessels of the heart muscle. Id. at 1365.
274. A protein is composed of a chain of specific and ordered number of building
blocks called amino acids. t-PA is made up of 527 amino acids. Id. A substitution means
that one amino acid in the chain is different. A deletion molecule means that several of
the amino acids which make up the protein are missing entirely. Id. at 1367-68.
275. Wellcome, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
276. Id. at 1371.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1365-66.
280. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
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pected to introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the
piracy. '
Second, a pioneer inventor can only claim to the extent of
its own knowledge. 82 Although future technological advances
may be generally foreseen by a pioneer inventor, the specific
limitations are unknowable and thus the claim language cannot
include them.283 The Supreme Court recognized long ago in
Tilghman v. Proctor2 8 4 that it is precisely such an invention
which should be protected from infringement by the doctrine of
equivalents.8 5 Even the Federal Circuit has recognized that
post-invention advances or modifications of function do not
alone negate infringement.28
8
The application of this author's proposal to the Wellcome
case would require that the court first make a determination of
the claimant's pioneer or improvement status. Once pioneer sta-
tus is established, application of the Graver Tank test on an "as
a whole" basis would likely reach a finding of infringement, pro-
vided the patentee had not limited his claims during the
prosecution.
There are also policy considerations to be advanced for al-
lowing the patentee a broad range of equivalents in the
Wellcome case. It is entirely possible that plaintiff generally
knew, from recombinant work with other proteins, that deletions
or substitutions in some parts of the t-PA amino acid chain
would likely result in modified but functional t-PA. s7 However,
without being confident of that information, the inventor was
unwilling to delay patenting the invention. By not using the "as
a whole" test to permit broad equivalents protection, and in-
stead applying the narrower element by element standard,
courts are forcing future inventors to delay patenting an inven-
tion until every variable can be claimed.
281. Id. at 607.
282. See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (state of the art "disclosed,
as the only then existing way to make such a polymer .... ") Id. at 606.
283. "To now say that appellants should have disclosed in 1953 the amorphous form
which on this record did not exist until 1962, would be to impose an impossible burden
on inventors and thus on the patent system." Id.
284. 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
285. Id. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
286. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
287. Wellcome, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
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Narrow decisions on equivalents will also encourage defend-
ants in infringement suits to magnify arcane and unimportant
scientific differences to avoid infringement, as they have in
Welcome. For example, in this case, there is a strong likelihood
that differences in the binding affinity and molecule half-life
cited by defendants288 are picayune. They do not by themselves
allow the inference that the means by which the accused mole-
cules function differ from those of the plaintiff's protein. This
case is a perfect example of a situation in which "there is no
literal infringement but liability is nevertheless appropriate to
prevent what is in essence a pirating of the patentee's
invention. 289
In Hormone Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc.,29° the dis-
trict court addressed the question of whether a patent for syn-
thesized human growth hormone (HGH)29 1 of a specified amino
acid sequence was infringed by recombinantly produced proteins
of a slightly different sequence. At the time of patent applica-
tion, the patentee thought he had identified the correct amino
acid sequence of this hormone and had developed a process for
its synthesis.2 9 2 The amino acid sequence of the patented protein
was subsequently found to differ from the sequence of natural
HGH, whereas the structure of the accused proteins, recombi-
nantly produced, was found to be identical to that of natural
HGH.293
After determining that there was no literal infringement,
the district court reviewed the file history of plaintiff's patent.2 94
The court held that the patentee had secured patentability by
limiting his claim to the specific amino acid sequence of the pat-
ented protein and had given up a broad claim to HGH itself or
its derivatives. 295 The patentee was therefore estopped from en-
compassing the accused products as equivalents.296 Thus, the
288. Id. at 1369-71.
289. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
290. 708 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
291. HGH, a protein, is produced by the human pituitary gland and is involved in
the regulation of growth. It is used clinically to treat growth deficiencies. Id. at 1098-99.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1104.
295. Id. at 1105.
296. Id. at 1104-05.
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district court was applying file history estoppel to limit the
scope of the patent claims.
In reviewing this decision, the Federal Circuit cited the
broad Graver Tank three-part test 97 and re-examined the pros-
ecution history of plaintiff's patent.2 98 Judge Archer rejected the
district court's holding that the patentee was precluded from re-
covery by file wrapper estoppel.299 He found that there was am-
biguity in the prosecution history of the patent because the na-
ture of the amendments in the file was not clear.300 The court
held, therefore, that the reasons for the amendments needed to
be established before any infringement ruling could be made.30
This decision affirmed the notion that before file wrapper estop-
pel can be invoked to limit the application of equivalents, "a
close examination must be made as to, not only what was sur-
rendered, but also the reason for such a surrender."30' 2 Only if
estoppel does not apply, will the court reach the question of the
range of permissible equivalents. 303
As in previous Federal Circuit decisions, the Hormone Re-
search court's opinion lacked a discussion of plaintiff's pioneer-
ing or improvement status. The court did say that until the pat-
entee's method for synthesizing the protein was discovered,
HGH could only be obtained in small amounts by tedious ex-
traction methods. 04 Thus, the invention provided greater availa-
bility for the hormone. However, plaintiff's inventi6n was depen-
dent on a synthetic method which was not entirely successful.30 5
Furthermore, the defendant's recombinant method for produc-
ing the HGH was entirely different and also innovative. 06 Thus,
the court may have been faced with two inventions, each of
which was a big leap beyond its own prior art. In this type of
297. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
298. Hormone Research, 904 F.2d 1558 (1990).
299. Id. at 1567.
300. Id. at 1566-67.
301. Id. at 1565-67.
302. Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l Research, 738 F.2d 1237, 1243 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). See also supra notes 4, 126-27, 150-62 and accompanying text for discussions
of file history estoppel.
303. Hormone Research, 904 F.2d at 1567 n.14.
304. Id. at 1560 n.1.
305. Hormone Research, 708 F. Supp. at 1107.
306. See id. at 1105.
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situation, neither invention would be the equivalent of the other.
However, Judge Archer's reversal of the lower court did not
look to the relationship between each of the inventions and its
prior art. Instead, the decision was based entirely on the premise
that there could be no file history estoppel until the intent and
effect of the amendments made during the plaintiff's patent
prosecution were clarified.3 07 Thus, even if a district court re-
turns with a finding of no estoppel, it will still have to reach an
opinion on equivalents. To accomplish this, the Federal Circuit
will once more find itself immersed in a dispute over whether to
use the "as a whole" or "element by element" test. Performing
the pioneer/improvement analysis first, as suggested in the pre-
ceding section, would have permitted the court to resolve the
equivalents issue at the outset.
These two cases are good examples of the type which are
currently, and will continue to be, in dispute before the Federal
Circuit. The technology involved is extremely complex and, as
shown in both Wellcome and Hormone Research,30 8 the relative
importance of different parameters can be difficult to assess.
Without a clear mandate on how to apply the doctrine of
equivalents, judges and practitioners will continue to face a her-
culean task.
V. Conclusion
Courts must balance two policies in their decisions on in-
fringement. As this Note demonstrates, one important purpose
of the patent statute is to reward innovative and, today, inevita-
bly expensive, research which may result in a marketable prod-
uct for its inventor.0 9 The premise presented in this Note is
that real innovation comes only with pioneering research and
that it is this work the courts must protect. As Justice Douglas
said in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip.
Corp.,310 "[t]he invention to justify a patent ha[s] to serve the
ends of science - to push back the frontiers of chemistry,
307. Hormone Research, 904 F.2d at 1568-69.
308. Wellcome, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367-69; Hormone Research, 904 F.2d at
1565.
309. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
310. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
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physics and the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scien-
tific knowledge." 3
Courts should also take into consideration post-invention
advances and their ability to increase the public's available op-
tions. While deserving of protection, post-invention modifica-
tions are not as innovative as the true pioneers. Thus, the Fed-
eral Circuit would be justified in finding in favor of the pioneers
on infringement more often. s12 There is merit in the criticism
voiced by the Supreme Court in Atlantic Works v. Brady:31'
Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges [patents]
tends rather to obstruct rather than stimulate inventions. It cre-
ates a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to
watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in
the form of patented monopolies, which enables them to lay a
heavy tax upon the industry of the country without contributing
anything to the real advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the
honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of con-
cealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious ac-
countings for profits made in good faith."
The Federal Circuit should return to the original use of the doc-
trine of equivalents, which gave broader protection to pioneer
than to improvement inventions. In so doing, it would bring or-
der to this body of law, thereby fulfilling its mandate and creat-
ing a consistency upon which lower courts and inventors could
rely.
Esther Steinhauer
311. Id. at 154.
312. The Federal Circuit has been described as being pro-patent. See Dreyfuss,
supra note 254, at 26.
313. 107 U.S. 192 (1883).
314. Id. at 200.
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